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INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
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RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000914

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S, AF/C, AF/E
NSC FOR MGAVIN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

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TAGS: [PINS](#) [PHUM](#) [PGOV](#) [UN](#) [AU](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR BONA MALWAL DISCUSSES
ELECTIONS, SOUTHERN WOES

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Classified By: CDA Robert E. Whitehead, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

11. (C) Summary: Charge d'Affaires Whitehead met with Presidential Adviser Bona Malwal on July 29 at the latter's request. A former minister in the late 1970s under Nimeiri and a long-time antagonist of the late John Garang, Malwal continues to pursue politics in the South while maintaining strong contacts with the North. He addressed the national political landscape in the context of upcoming elections, and delivered his usual blistering critique of governance in the South. Malwal pitched the option of extending the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement's six year interim period for two more years, until 2013. However, this is a proposal that will find no support from the south's Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). End Summary.

ELECTIONS

12. (C) Malwal opened the discussion by stating that the National Congress Party (NCP) strongly supports 2010 national elections due to their huge advantage in organization and resources. The NCP also believes, he said, that the elections will serve as referendum on the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President Bashir. He noted that as things now stand, Bashir would emerge victorious from the polls because the traditional political parties in the North are moribund and no new political groupings have emerged. He was dismissive of Mirghani and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) as a spent force, and he said that he was increasingly puzzled by the "bizarre" behavior of Sadiq Al Mahdi and his Umma Party. Malwal said that he had broken contact with al Mahdi after a "wasted" meeting in which the former prime minister described his intention to form an alliance between Umma and the NCP, only to announce a few days later that he had come to an agreement with Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Malwal added that al Mahdi was interested in changing the government but not the system, and Ibrahim was intent only on taking over the system by force.

WOE IS THE SOUTH

13. (C) Malwal further asserted that the SPLM has no competitive candidate to run for the national presidency in 2010 and that the South would prefer that there be no

elections at all. He continued that the senior leadership of the SPLM was intent on moving straight to the referendum instead, because the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) could not run on its record of four years of governance: "there is no semblance of a government in Juba able to evolve into an independent state." He accused the SPLM of having no sympathy for the average person in the South, and said that the only way to avoid a "Somaliaization" of Sudan was to protect the "victimized" population of the South by encamping the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). He claimed the SPLA was the only southern institution with any real power, and that the 2005 CPA interim period should be extended by two years to 2013. In his view, the latter would give the South more time to prepare to govern itself.

14. (C) Malwal's few good words were reserved for GOSS President and Government of National Unity (GNU) First Vice President Salva Kiir. (Note. Malwal and Kiir are reportedly close due to common ties to Warrap State. End note) Malwal said that Kiir was hard to read and had few original ideas of his own, but that he would be the "ideal" leader of the South in a peaceful period. Unfortunately, Malwal continued, Kiir was ill-suited for the difficult environment that currently prevailed. He went on to describe the SPLM's inability to quell tribal conflicts throughout its territory and criticized authorities in Juba for preventing other political parties from operating. He described the travails of his own South Sudan Democratic Forum (SSDF), claiming that the GoSS had blocked his vehicles from carrying him into the countryside and had arrested his bodyguards. He said that during the SSDF's last congress in Juba, police had physically wrestled away his microphone to prevent him from delivering his thirty-page, two-hour concluding speech (Note: Quite possibly to the relief of what he claimed was an audience of 4,000. End Note.)

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15. (C) Comment: We provide Malwal's comments for what they are worth. His description of the state of political parties in the North encapsulates the pre-electoral period accurately, and there are indications that the SPLM is not as enthusiastic about elections as its putative GNU partner, the NCP. The SPLM has struggled with governance issues, although not as badly as Malwal claims, and he was hopelessly off the mark in his belief that there is any possibility that the SPLM would be willing to wait until 2013 to schedule a referendum in the South. He was also off target about his own appeal in the South and the popularity of the SSDF. A long-time antagonist of John Garang with close ties to the North, Malwal is widely-viewed by most Southerners of our acquaintance as a stalking horse for the NCP, the Lam Akol of yore.

WHITEHEAD